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This paper gives a new answer to the challenging question raised by Glosten (1994): “Is the
electronic order book inevitable?”. While the order book enables traders to compete to supply
anonymous liquidity, the specialist system enables one to reap the beneﬁts from repeated inter-
action. We compare a competitive limit order book and a limit order book with a specialist, like
the NYSE. Thanks to non-anonymous interaction, mediated by brokers, uninformed investors
can obtain good liquidity from the specialist. This, however, creates an adverse selection prob-
lem on the limit order book. Market liquidity and social welfare are improved by the specialist
if adverse selection is severe and if brokers have long horizon, so that reputation becomes a
matter of concern for them. In contrast, if asymmetric information is limited, spreads are wider
and utilitarian welfare is lower when the specialist competes with the limit order book than in
a pure limit order book market.
Keywords: limit order book, specialist, hybrid market
JEL Classiﬁcation: G10, G24, D82
∗Many of the ideas in this paper were developed in discussions with my Ph.D supervisor B. Biais. I am grateful
t oU .A x e l s o n ,K .H e e n ,T .M a r i o t t i ,T .R a m a d o r a i ,B .R i n d i ,P .S t r ö m b e r g ,a n dE .T h i b a u l tf o rh e l p f u lc o m m e n t s
and discussions. I would like to thank seminar participants at Aarhus University, Columbia Business School, HEC
P a r i s ,I E S E ,L S EP h DS e m i n a r ,M a a s t r i c h tU n i v e r s i t y ,S I F R ,S t o c k h o l mS c h o o lo fE c o n o m i c s ,T o u l o u s eU n i v e r s i t y ,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, University of Amsterdam, the University of Michigan Ann Arbor, the University of
Toronto and the University of Utah. All omissions and errors are mine.
†GREMAQ, Toulouse University, and Swedish Institute for Financial Research. E-mail: sabrina.buti@sifr.org1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The battle between exchanges concerns liquidity and price: when investors come to the market
they want to execute their orders at the best price. Which type of market structure will fulﬁll most
investors’ expectations? Glosten (1994) analyzes whether the electronic order book is inevitable.
He shows that the open limit order book (LOB) does “as well as can be hoped at handling extreme
adverse selection problems”1 and he points out that no other anonymous exchange can improve on
the LOB. However, in this new age of computerised trading, the existence of a ﬂoor market like
the NYSE is not in line with Glosten’s results. A possible explanation could be that people prefer
to trade where they know other traders gather. This implies that an exchange is likely to attract
more trading volume once it has a large amount of liquidity, even if there are more eﬃcient but less
liquid alternatives. However, an alternative explanation could be the advantage of the ﬂoor system
in comparison to anonymous electronic markets: relationship trading. So, what if competition to
the LOB comes from a non-anonymous market architecture where relationship trading is possible?
In order to answer this question, we compare two diﬀerent market structures. The ﬁrst market
structure is an anonymous LOB with free entry in which the market promotes competition between
liquidity suppliers. The second market structure is a specialist market. In this market structure
one still ﬁnds competitive liquidity suppliers on the LOB, but liquidity can also be oﬀered by a
monopolist specialist. The specialist interacts repeatedly with the brokers on the ﬂoor, this allows
him to build a relationship with the brokers based on trust and reputation. When brokers credibly
certify to the specialist that their customers are uninformed, the specialist can oﬀer better quotes
than the LOB. As a result, in the hybrid market informed traders will go on the anonymous LOB
to beneﬁt from competition, while uninformed traders will go to the specialist, to beneﬁtf r o m
relationship trading.
The ﬁrst aim of this work is to analyze the trade-oﬀ involved by the coexistence of the specialist
and the LOB. On the one hand, the specialist worsens adverse selection on the LOB: Ready (1999)
ﬁnds that orders stopped and executed directly by the specialist are more proﬁtable for liquidity
suppliers than orders allowed to trade with the book.2 On the other hand, the specialist lowers the
asymmetric information problem via relationship trading. The idea that the unique relationship be-
tween the specialists and ﬂoor brokers leads to less anonymity is supported by Garﬁnkel and Nimal-
endran (2003). They analyze the change in spread measures on the NYSE and the NASDAQ on days
when an insider trades, to assess the ability of specialists to detect and respond to insider trading.
They ﬁnd evidence consistent with less anonymity in the NYSE specialist system compared to the
NASDAQ dealer system. A similar result is provided by Heidle and Huang (2002) and is supported
by the analysis of a natural experiment on actual insider trades done by Fishe and Robe (2004).
When a specialist coexists with the LOB, there is competition in the oﬀer of liquidity between
principals with diﬀerent information on the order ﬂow. The specialist knows if orders are unin-
formed, and can oﬀer better trading terms. The other liquidity suppliers are uninformed and can
1“Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?”, pag. 1129.
2Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) also ﬁnd evidence of “cream skimming” of uninformed trades on the NYSE.
2not discriminate between uninformed and informed traders. So, anticipating the increase in adverse
selection costs due to specialist “cream skimming”, the spread widens on the LOB.3
This trade-oﬀ is particularly interesting given the controversial results of the empirical literature
on the eﬀectiveness of the specialist in increasing market liquidity. On the one hand, Venkataram
(2001) shows that, other things equal, the NYSE (a specialist market) is more liquid than the
Paris Bourse (a limit order market) since the automated system is not able to replicate the beneﬁts
o fh u m a ni n t e r m e d i a t i o no nat r a d i n gﬂoor. On the other hand, Ready (1999) shows that the
specialist’s own trading worsens adverse selection costs borne by limit order traders. The previous
theoretical literature has considered just one of the two aspects: Benveniste et al. (1992) focuses
on the positive side, the lower level of asymmetric information due to relationship trading, while
Rock (1996) focuses on the negative side of the specialist, the higher adverse selection on the book.
Our model instead provides a joint analysis of these two eﬀects.
The second aim of this study is to endogenize both price and quantities quoted by the specialist
when he is competing with the LOB. The crucial role of both price and depth in the specialist’s
interaction with the LOB has been shown in the empirical works of Kavajecz (1999) and Kavajecz
and Odders-White (2001). However, the previous theoretical literature has focused on only one of
the two aspects. Dupont (2000) and Caglio and Kavajecz (2006) incorporate the specialist’s quoted
depth as an endogenous variable but in the absence of a limit order book. On the contrary, Rock
(1996), Seppi (1997) and Parlour and Seppi (2003) analyze the interaction between the specialist
and the LOB, but their models provide no role for the specialist’s quoted depth. In our model, we
analyze both the depth issue and the specialist’s interaction with the LOB.
The objective of our paper is threefold. First, we analyze how the adverse selection problem and
the competition from the LOB inﬂuence the price schedule oﬀered by the specialist to uninformed
traders. Second, we show the conditions in which a LOB with specialist can oﬀer better expected
trading terms than a LOB without specialist. Finally, we compare the welfare gains due to the
higher quantity oﬀered to uninformed traders by the specialist with the welfare loss due to the
worsening of the spread oﬀered on the LOB.
The LOB is modelled following the contract theory approach of Biais et al. (2000), when the
number of traders goes to inﬁnity. It is a publicly visible screen that provides traders with bids
and oﬀers, each specifying a price and a quantity available at that price. Liquidity on the LOB is
provided by a population of risk neutral liquidity suppliers. So, the equilibrium is characterized by
a zero expected proﬁt condition. Moreover, given the “discriminatory” nature of the book, asks
and bids will be related to “upper tail” and “lower tail” expectations as in Glosten (1994).4
3Madhavan and Soﬁanos (1998) show that the specialist participates more in the market when the bid-ask spread
is wide. We show that the widening of the spread could be simply motivated by the active participation of the
specialist on the market, anticipated by liquidity suppliers on the LOB, and the consequent worsening of adverse
selection costs on the LOB. So, instead of having the specialist attracted by the wide spread, the cause of the wide
spread could be the specialist himself.
4In this framework, liquidity suppliers can’t condition on total market order quantity. What the liquidity suppliers
know, for example, is that if a limit order to sell is hit, the market order is at least as large as the cumulated depth
of the book up to that price. Expectations of asset value given that this order has been hit are called “upper—tail
3We model the specialist-broker relationship as an inﬁnitely repeated game. The risk-neutral
broker is trading on behalf of risk-averse traders who can be informed or not. We assume that the
client’s type is known by the broker but not by the specialist. So, when the broker reports his client
as uninformed, the specialist oﬀers better trading terms in comparison to the book. However, to
avoid misreporting on clients’ type by the broker, the specialist punishes ex-post the broker who
lies by refusing to improve quotes for that broker in the future. This implies that if the client
is uninformed, the broker goes to the specialist, while if the client is informed, the broker weighs
the better trading terms currently oﬀered by the specialist against the future discounted beneﬁts
of continuing a relationship with the specialist. Hence, cooperation will be easier for brokers who
place a lot of weight on the future.
The specialist selects the price schedule that maximizes his proﬁts. The inverse demand function
he considers depends on the level of asymmetric information and on the discounting rate of the
broker. The specialist compares the proﬁts of oﬀe r i n gah i g hq u a n t i t yw i t ht h er e n t sh eh a st ol e a v e
to the uninformed trader in order to prevent broker’s misreporting. For low levels of the discount
rate, future trading opportunities are highly valuable for the broker and a large quantity can be
oﬀered by the specialist. However, as the discount rate, or as the asymmetric information problem
increases, the value of keeping a good relationship with the specialist decreases and, to prevent
misreporting, the specialist has to oﬀer a less attractive price-quantity schedule.
If asymmetric information worsens or if the relationship with the broker is less stable, the
specialist’s reaction focuses more on depth than on the price. The quoted depth is a monotone
decreasing function of adverse selection costs and a monotone increasing function of the probability
of continuation of the relationship with the specialist, while price is not monotone in these two
parameters.
In welfare terms, the specialist is Pareto improving for high levels of adverse selection, when
the LOB quoted spread is already wide given the high risk of trading with informed traders. If this
is the case, then there is no trade-oﬀ in the market: the introduction of the specialist only has a
positive welfare eﬀect since better liquidity is oﬀered to uninformed traders and the specialist makes
proﬁts. The negative eﬀect due to the worsening of the LOB is absent. For lower levels of adverse
selection, the trade-oﬀ arises. However, the LOB with specialist can still improve on the LOB if
the discount rate is low. If this is the case, the broker highly values the possibility of interacting
with the specialist in the future. So, the specialist can improve on the trading terms oﬀered by
t h eL O B .H eo ﬀers a price schedule to uninformed traders that is more attractive than that of
the LOB’s and guarantees him high proﬁts. Finally, if the discount rate is high, the specialist
oﬀers uninformed traders a lower quantity than the one available on the LOB without specialist.
Moreover, the necessity to control the broker lowers specialist’s proﬁt. As a result, the welfare is
lower in a LOB with specialist.
The impact of adverse selection on depth is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Kavajecz
(1999). He ﬁnds that specialists use depth as a strategic choice variable to regulate the amount of
expectations”, and have been used ﬁrst by Glosten (1994) for a LOB with an inﬁnite number of competing market
makers.
4liquidity they provide.5 For example, he shows how specialists and limit order traders reduce depth
around informative events, reducing their exposure to adverse selection costs. In our analysis, both
the specialist and the limit order traders reduce the quoted quantity if the asymmetric information
problem worsens.
Our model is also consistent with the results obtained by Battalio et al. (2005). They claim
that if relationships are important in attenuating adverse selection problems, changes of specialist’s
location on the ﬂoor should inﬂuence liquidity costs since they often imply a relationship ending.
Indeed, they ﬁnd that liquidity costs increase when a stock moves. Similarly, in our model the quan-
tity oﬀered by the specialist to uninformed traders is decreasing in the weakness of his relationship
with ﬂoor brokers.
Our work also oﬀers an explanation for the diﬀerential execution costs among specialist ﬁrms
on the NYSE documented by Cao et al. (1997), Corwin (1999) and Coughenour and Deli (2002).
Coughenour and Deli show that diﬀerences in liquidity provision arise from diﬀerences in specialist
ﬁrm organizational form. They argue that specialists using their own capital have a greater ability
to reduce adverse selection costs, since they can credibly bond information-sharing relationships
and they have found evidence to support their hypothesis. If we interpret the broker’s discount
rate as the probability of continuing the relationship with the specialist, our paper shows that if
brokers perceive the relationship as more stable, the specialist is able to oﬀer better trading terms.
In this way, our work provides a theoretical justiﬁcation for the results obtained by Coughenour
and Deli.
Our results suggest that a relationship trading system can improve on the trading terms oﬀered
by the LOB for stocks that are highly exposed to adverse selection problems. So, we would expect
t h es p e c i a l i s tt ob eb e n e ﬁcial for thinly traded stocks or for stocks in their initial quotation phase.
Notice also that if the relationship with the specialist is stable, then the specialist can be beneﬁcial
in welfare terms also for stocks with low adverse selection problems. Even if the broker is worse
oﬀ, the high specialist’s proﬁt guarantees a higher welfare level. The actual system that imposes
such an obligation on the specialist to guarantee a “fair and orderly market” could be a way to
redistribute welfare gains due to relationship trading from the specialist to traders. However, our
model suggests that once the specialist’s system is in place, it can not be overcome by a competing
pure LOB even when it is ineﬃcient. The introduction of a specialist on a LOB should be carefully
thought over.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how the paper relates
to the previous literature. Section 3 introduces the model structure and its hypotheses. Section
4 focuses on the pure LOB market structure. Section 5 analyzes the hybrid market, LOB and
specialist, and in particular the price schedule oﬀered by the specialist. Section 6 focuses on
the comparison between the LOB with and without a specialist: we analyze quoted and eﬀective
spreads, and utilitarian welfare. Some empirical and policy implications are derived. Finally,
Section 7 presents some concluding remarks. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
5Kavajecz shows that specialists change their quoted depth in 90% of all quote changes. Moreover, 50% of all
quote changes are unaccompanied by changes in the quoted price.
52L i t e r a t u r e
This article is closely related to four lines of prior works. The ﬁrst of these is the work of Benveniste
et al. (1992) on the importance of relationship trading in mitigating the eﬀects of asymmetric
information. In their model, the specialist can impose sanctions (i.e. less improvement on quoted
prices or less favorable future prices) on traders using private information. Since the traders bear
the full cost of informed trading, they are less likely to impose adverse selection costs on others.6
There are two crucial diﬀerences with our work. First, the specialist is not strategic: he is only
regulated by the zero proﬁt condition if passive or by the maximization of the broker’s proﬁts
if active. This hypothesis underestimates the costs of giving an informational advantage due to
relationship trading to a proﬁt seeking agent. Second, in their approach liquidity is provided to
the market by the specialist only, while in our model the specialist competes with the LOB. In this
way we can jointly analyze the potential beneﬁts of introducing a specialist on the LOB with the
eventual costs due to the worsening of adverse selection on the LOB.
A second line of work involves strategic liquidity supply with adverse selection. In particular,
we are interested in the screening game where ﬁrst market makers post price schedules and then
one strategic informed trader selects the quantity to trade. The adverse selection problem in a
discriminatory auction has been analyzed by Glosten (1994).7 We use the Glosten approach, and
the contract theory framework of Biais et al. (2000) to model the LOB. However, we introduce in
their setting a liquidity supplier with a comparative advantage: the capacity to build relationships
due to repeated interaction.
The third line of work concerns the comparison between diﬀerent market structures. Seppi
(1997) analyzes an hybrid market where a specialist competes with value traders in oﬀering liquidity.
Active traders who submit market orders are not strategic, while in our model investors optimally
select the quantity they want to trade on the LOB depending on market conditions. Therefore, in
Seppi (1997) the specialist cannot use prices to inﬂuence the submitted quantity, while in our work
the specialist uses both quantity and price strategically. Moreover, adverse selection costs are not
explicitly modelled and are just summarized in the decreasing submissions costs on the LOB. On
the contrary, in our framework adverse selection costs are endogenous since there is asymmetric
information on the asset value. Parlour and Seppi (2003) extend the work of Seppi (1997) and
analyze two competing exchanges: a pure LOB and a hybrid market with both a specialist and a
LOB. Again, the main diﬀerences with our framework are that both the quantity traded by the
agents and adverse selection costs are exogenous.
Finally, other works have analyzed the joint determination of the optimal price and depth by the
specialist. Dupont (2000) and Caglio and Kavajecz (2006) consider a monopolist specialist, while
in our model the monopolistic market power of the specialist is limited by both the competition
from the LOB and the necessity to induce truthtelling from the broker.
6A similar conclusion is reached by Chan and Weinstein (1993): in their model specialists reward ﬂoor brokers
with tighter bid-ask spreads on future trades if they reveal private information on their orders.
7Glosten (1989) considers a monopolistic liquidity supplier, Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) focuses on the duopoly
case, while Biais et al. (2000) shows that as the number of liquidity supplier goes to inﬁnity, the oligopolistic
equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium analyzed in Glosten (1994).
63 The Model
We analyze a ﬁnancial market for a risky asset where liquidity is supplied by risk-neutral limit
order traders to risk-averse and expected utility-maximizing traders. In each period t ∈ [1,...,∞],
a trader arrives on the market with a certain willingness to trade. His motivation to trade can be
private information on the asset value, inventory rebalancing, or a mixture of the two. We compare
two market structures: a competitive LOB and a competitive LOB with a specialist. In the ﬁrst
structure, liquidity is oﬀered on the LOB by a large number of limit order traders posting quotes.
In the second structure, liquidity is oﬀered by both a large number of limit order traders posting
quotes on the LOB and a specialist, who is allowed to improve LOB quotations by direct interaction
with ﬂoor brokers.
3.1 The Information Structure
The value of the asset is given in each period by vt = st + εt,w h e r est is the private signal of
the trader and εt is a noise on the signal, εt ∼ (0,σ2). Notice that the informative signal lasts
only one period. The informed trader also privately observes his endowment It in the risky asset.
Information and endowment shocks are not correlated among diﬀerent periods. We assume that
the inventory shock takes the values {I,0,−I},w h e r eI>0, with equal probability, while the
informative signal takes the values {s,s,−s,−s},w h e r es < s, with probability η or zero with
probability 1 − 4η,w h e r eη ∈ [0,1/4]. The parameter η represents the probability of informed
trading: the lower η, the higher the probability to have an uninformed trader on the market.
3.2 Types of Agent
In the model there are four types of agent: traders, liquidity suppliers, brokers and a specialist.
3.2.1 Traders
As already mentioned, traders come on the market for a combination of inventory rebalancing and
private information reasons. The trader’s wealth in period t is the following:
Wt =( Qt + It)vt − Pt(Qt)Qt
where Qt is the total traded quantity of the asset and Pt(Qt) is the average price paid for that
quantity. We assume that the trader has mean variance preferences8 and a risk aversion parameter
γ. His objective function is stated as:
Ut = E [Wt | It,s t] −
γ
2
V [Wt | It,s t]
We deﬁne θt = st − γσ2It. This parameter represents the willingness to trade of the trader who
arrives in period t and it reﬂects the trader’s mix of risk sharing and informational motivations to
8We can obtain the same result by assuming normality in the error term and CARA utility function with absolute
risk-aversion parameter γ.
7trade. Therefore, it is increasing in trader’s private signal and decreasing in trader’s initial position

















The ﬁrst term represents the reservation utility of the trader if he decides not to participate in the
market, while the second term represents his gains from trade.
Willingness to Trade Distribution. Given our assumptions about the distribution of s and I,
θt is distributed in the following way:
Inventory Prob. 1/3 1/3 1/3
Signal Prob. Shock Values −I 0 I
η s s + γσ2I s s − γσ2I
η s s + γσ2I s s − γσ2I
1 − 4η 0 γσ2I 0 −γσ2I
η −s −s + γσ2I −s −s − γσ2I
η −s −s + γσ2I −s −s − γσ2I
In order to have asymmetric information on the market, the specialist and the liquidity suppliers
have to be ignorant as to whether orders are motivated by information or by inventory shocks, so
we assume that: s = s − γσ2I = γσ2I, s = s + γσ2I and s − γσ2I = −s + γσ2I =0 . Given these
equalities, we deﬁne: θl
i = θl
ni = s = γσ2I, θm = s =2 γσ2I and θh =3 γσ2I.S o ,θt is distributed
as in the following table:
Inventory Prob. 1/3 1/3 1/3
Signal Prob. Shock Values −I 0 I
η s =2 γσ2I θh =3 γσ2I θm =2 γσ2I θl
i = γσ2I
η s = γσ2I θm =2 γσ2I θl
i = γσ2I 0
1 − 4η 0 θl
ni = γσ2I 0 −θl
ni = −γσ2I
η −s = −γσ2I 0 −θl
i = −γσ2I −θm = −2γσ2I
η −s = −2γσ2I −θl
i = −γσ2I −θm = −2γσ2I −θh = −3γσ2I
Even if θl
i = θl
ni, there is a crucial diﬀerence between the two types of traders due to their
diﬀerent motivation to trade: θl
ni is on the market only for inventory rebalancing, while θl
i trades






the group of all types with a low evaluation of the asset and by ph, pm, pl
i and pl
ni the probabilities
respectively of types θh, θm, θl
i and θl
ni. Notice that, by construction, the two sides of the market
are perfectly symmetric. Hence, we analyze only the ask side.
83.2.2 Brokers
The risk-neutral broker is trading on behalf of risk-averse traders and represents, in diﬀerent periods,
clients who come to the market for diﬀerent reasons. We assume that the broker knows the identity
of his client. For example, he observes if his client is a passive fund manager, who is trading to
rebalance his inventory, or a smart investor, like a hedge fund, who is trading for both information
and inventory reasons. Hence, the broker knows whether his client is uninformed or not and he
is able to diﬀerentiate between θl





(i.e. the hedge fund).
However, knowing the identity of the trader does not tell to the broker the informed trader’s private





. The broker is evaluated at the
end of each trading period by the single investor. He extracts a constant fraction of the investor’s
surplus, the gains from trade.9 Hence, he maximizes his intertemporal utility given the LOB and


































represents the gains from trade, θa is the type an-
nounced by the client, b ∈ [0,1] is the constant fraction of the gains from trade that is assigned to
the broker and r is the broker’s discount factor. The discount factor has two interpretations: it
could be the T-bill rate and so the discounting would represent an opportunity loss, or 1/(1 + r)
could represent the probability of continuation of the relationship with the specialist. In this last
case, an increase in r represents a weakening of the specialist-broker relationship.
We assume that if the broker is indiﬀerent between trading on the LOB or with the specialist for
his uninformed clients, he will go to the specialist.10 Moreover, we assume that the client submits
his order to the broker in both market structures.11 In the LOB without a specialist, the broker
executes the order directly on the book (passive broker). In the LOB with a specialist, the broker
plays an active role: he considers LOB quotes, asks for specialist’s improvement and selects the
best oﬀe r( a c t i v eb r o k e r ) . W ea s s u m et h a ti ft he broker accepts the specialist’s oﬀer, he cannot
also trade on the LOB.
9This hypothesis implies that the reward of the broker is proportional to the satisfaction of the client. Even if
brokerage fees are generally ﬁxed, on the NYSE a client goes to the broker expecting to obtain good trading terms.
It is reasonable to assume that the reward of the broker depends on how much his client is satisﬁed by his work.
10This hypothesis inﬂuences the model’s results only in the least interesting case from an economic point of view,
where any positive value of the broker/specialist relationship worsens the broker’s truthtelling constraint. In this
case, the beneﬁts related to the introduction of the specialist are clearly limited. An extensive discussion of the
alternative hypotesis (i.e. the indiﬀerent broker goes to the LOB) is presented in the Appendix B.
11When the broker trades on the LOB without a specialist, he plays a passive role. We could have assumed that
in this market structure the client can trade directly on the book. However, we decided not to consider diﬀerentials
in order execution fees in our analysis and have preferred to focus on relationship trading.
93.2.3 Liquidity Suppliers
Liquidity suppliers post quotes on the LOB. They are risk neutral and their number is large enough
to drive proﬁts on the LOB to zero due to the high price competition. Moreover, since the LOB
is anonymous, liquidity suppliers can not build a relationship with brokers. For every level of the
book, they satisfy the following zero proﬁt condition:




where q(θ) and P(θ) are the marginal quantity and the relative price oﬀered at each level of the
book. Notice that liquidity suppliers are unable to diﬀerentiate between types θl
i and θl
ni,s i n c e
both traders have the same asset evaluation when they arrive on the LOB. So, it is impossible
ex-ante to discriminate between them.
3.2.4 The Specialist
The specialist trades the asset with a representative broker. We assume that the specialist has no
obligations imposed by the exchange authorities in order to concentrate on relationship trading.
Hence, in our framework, the specialist is a proﬁt seeking agent who owns a comparative advantage
towards the other liquidity suppliers: the possibility to build a relationship with brokers due to
non-anonymous repeated interaction. Thanks to this trust relationship, the specialist can oﬀer
better trading terms to traders after the broker’s announcement. Notice that the specialist is able
to improve on the trading terms oﬀered by the LOB only for uninformed clients. In fact, we have
assumed that the broker is able to diﬀerentiate only between uninformed and informed clients. So,
if a client is informed, his type revelation must be incentivized and the specialist does not have
any informative advantage compared to the LOB. As showed by Biais at al. (2000), in this case an
extra strategic liquidity supplier can not improve on fully competitive LOB’s quotations.12
We assume that the specialist knows ex-post the broker’s informative signal13 and he can commit
to never improving on LOB trading terms for a broker who has misreported his client’s trading
motives. This hypothesis is based on the idea that the specialist is trading at the same time with
many diﬀerent brokers, so he can credibly commit not to trading anymore with anyone of them.
If the client is uninformed, the broker will go to the specialist to ask for better trading terms. If
the client is informed, then the broker will weigh the better trading terms oﬀered by the specialist
against the future beneﬁts of continuing a relationship with the specialist. Hence, the broker could
prefer to trade with the book and keep the possibility of interacting with the specialist in the future.
12In particular, Biais et al. (2000) show that a market with inﬁnite strategic risk-neutral traders, competing in
schedules to supply liquidity, is equivalent to a Glosten (1994) limit order book. In our setting, if the specialist has to
induce truthtelling from broker’s clients, than he is just an additional liquidity supplier in a Glosten (1994) LOB and
can not improve on liquidity. Moreover, even if we consider the specialist’s oﬀers as an additional market, Glosten
(1994) shows that no other anonymous exchange can compete with a LOB.
13We assume for simplicity as Benveniste et al. (1992) and Seppi (1990) that violations of no-informed trading
agreements are observable ex-post. We refer to Desgranges and Foucault (2005) for an alternative modelization that
shows how no-informed trading agreements can still be sustained when their violation cannot be observed.
10Notice that the specialist solves the same problem each period, unless the broker has cheated
before. The specialist’s quoted quantity and price are therefore independent of time: QS
t = QS
and PS
t = PS. Moreover we assume that the specialist can commit to quote the same quantity and










niPSQS if no deviation
0 if deviation
3.3 Gains from Trade
We can reformulate the gains from trade in terms of marginal quantities oﬀered at each level of the
book. We denote by qh
t = qt(θh), qm
t = qt(θm) and ql
t = qt(θl) the marginal quantities oﬀered on the
book for each agent’s type, and by Ph
t = Pt(θh), Pm
t = Pt(θm) and Pl
t = Pt(θl) the corresponding
marginal price.
Limit Order Book without a Specialist. The structure of the LOB implies that the broker
does not announce his client’s type. In fact, the broker hits quantities on the LOB ex-post, when
liquidity suppliers have already posted limit orders. Notice also that clients have no incentives to
misreport their type since they have the same objective function as brokers. Gains from trade, if
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©
θh,θm,θlª
Limit Order Book with a Specialist. Limit orders are still posted ex-ante by liquidity sup-
pliers, but the specialist can now oﬀer better trading terms to uninformed clients. Informed clients
have no incentives to misreport their type to the broker as in the previous case. However, the broker
could have an incentive to misreport his client’s type to the specialist to obtain quote improvement.
Gains from trade are stated as:
GTS
t (e θ,b θ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨



































if b θ = θl
ni
where e θ is the agent’s type and b θ is the type announced by the broker.
Expected Gains from Trade. If the broker has never deviated, he will trade with the LOB if











11If the broker has deviated, he will trade only on the LOB since the specialist is no longer going to
improve LOB quotations for him. We assume that the LOB can not improve on the oﬀered prices
and quantities once a broker has been caught lying. In fact, the breakdown of the specialist/broker
relationship should not be visible to third parties. Moreover, there is still the problem of order
picking by the other brokers who have the possibility of asking the specialist for better quotes.
Therefore, if we consider trader’s gains from trade, nothing changes for broker’s informed clients,
since the broker can still go on the anonymous LOB to execute their orders. On the contrary, gains
from trade for type θl




i), the gains from trade available on
the LOB for type θl


















The higher is the probability to have uninformed clients, the greater is the loss related to the
breaking with the specialist. The better the trading terms oﬀered to uninformed clients, the higher
the costs of no longer trading with the specialist.
3.4 Timing
The timing is the following for each period t:
1. Competitive liquidity suppliers post quotes on the LOB anticipating, if there is a specialist,
that their limit orders will be hit only by informed traders.
2. A trader arrives on the market and goes to a broker to perform his transaction. The broker
decides, depending on his client’s motivations to trade, if he goes to the specialist to ask for
better trading terms, or if he executes the order directly on the book.
3. If the broker goes to the specialist and has never deviated before, then the specialist oﬀers
him better trading terms. Otherwise the specialist oﬀers the same terms of trade as the LOB.
4. After the transaction, the specialist discovers the trader’s informed/uninformed status.
4 The Limit Order Book Market
The LOB is a publicly visible screen that provides traders with bids and oﬀers, each of which specify
a price and a quantity available at that price. Liquidity suppliers compete on prices as in Glosten
(1994). Reputation plays no role in this anonymous market structure and we can drop the time









E(s | θ ≥ e θ) − P(e θ)
i
q(e θ)=0
(IR(e θ)) GTLOB(e θ) ≥ 0
q(θ),P (θ) solve P1 for θ ≤ e θ
Liquidity suppliers oﬀer the quantity that maximizes the gains from trade of the lowest investor’s
type who hits that limit order. Any larger quantity would be hit only by traders with higher asset
evaluations and would imply negative proﬁts.14 Moreover, liquidity suppliers take into account that
the trader has already hit the orders at the lower levels of the LOB.
Lemma 1 In a LOB without a specialist, prices are equal to upper tail expectations: P(e θ)=E(s |
θ ≥ e θ). The spread is increasing in the probability of informed trading, η. Marginal traded quantities
are increasing in η for θh and θm,a n dd e c r e a s i n gf o rθl.
The optimal marginal quantities oﬀered on the LOB depend on the level of asymmetric information
in the market. As η decreases, the oﬀer of liquidity moves from the high to the low levels of the
book since adverse selection costs are lower. Hence, the marginal quantity for θl is decreasing in
η, while marginal quantities for θh and θm are increasing in η. As a result, the limit order book
presents diﬀerent shapes depending on the size of adverse selection costs as the table shows:
Marginal Depth at Ask Prices






























where a = {1,2,3} corresponds respectively to the LOB available for η<1/11, η ∈ [1/11,1/7) and
η ∈ [1/7,1/4].
14As an example, consider the quantity oﬀered to client θ





h are eager to buy a bigger quantity than type θ
l at price P(θ
l). So, if liquidity suppliers
oﬀer a bigger quantity than the one demanded by type θ
l, they realize negative proﬁts on the extra quantity. In fact,
the expected value of the asset is no more P(θ
l)=E(s | θ ≥ θ
l), but E(s | θ ≥ θ
m).
135 The Hybrid Market: The Limit Order Book and a Specialist
We now consider a market with competitive liquidity suppliers on the LOB and a specialist. The
broker compares the LOB and the specialist’s oﬀer in order to obtain the better trading terms for
his client. The specialist improves LOB quotes only for broker’s uninformed clients and inﬂuences
the liquidity available on the LOB. In fact, liquidity suppliers anticipate the specialist’s “cream
skimming” and update their expectations on the level of asymmetric information in the market.
5.1 The Limit Order Book with a Specialist
Liquidity suppliers solve the same problem as in the LOB without a specialist, but they take into
account in computing upper tail expectations that t h es p e c i a l i s tc o u l di m p r o v et r a d i n gt e r m sf o r
uninformed clients.
Lemma 2 Quantities and prices quoted on a LOB with a specialist are equal to the ones quoted
on a LOB without a specialist for high levels of asymmetric information, i.e. for η ∈ [1/7,1/4].
The specialist’s cream skimming of broker’s clients implies that adverse selection costs for
liquidity suppliers increase. In fact, the adverse selection problem becomes severe and independent
from the number of uninformed traders on the market since the introduction of the specialist
“eliminates” these traders from the LOB.15 Therefore, if η ∈ [1/7,1/4], nothing changes between
a LOB with and without a specialist. The adverse selection problem is already so severe that
any worsening of it, due to introduction of the specialist, does not produce any eﬀect on the LOB
and on trader’s gains from trade: GTLOB





. On the contrary, if
η<1/7, the introduction of the specialist lowers the liquidity oﬀered on the LOB. The LOB with
a specialist is summarized in the following table:
Ask LOB Prices Marginal Depth
Ph =2 γσ2I 2
3I
Pm =( 5 /3)γσ2I 1
3I
Pl =( 8 /5)γσ2I 0
5.2 The Specialist’s Problem
In our model the specialist is a monopolist: proﬁt maximization should determine the optimal price
a n dq u a n t i t yo ﬀered to uninformed traders. However, two eﬀects bind specialist’s monopoly power.
Firstly, the specialist has to prevent the broker from reporting an informed client as an uninformed
one. Secondly, the specialist has no control over the gains from trade available to informed traders
15AL O Bw i t has p e c i a l i s ti se q u i v a l e n tt oaL O Bw i t h o u tas p e c i a l i s tw h e r eη =1 /4. In fact, no uninformed trader
hits the LOB: they all go to the specialist to obtain better trading terms. This is equivalent to assuming that there
are only informed traders (i.e. η =1 /4) in the LOB without a specialist.































































ni) constraint states that for the broker the specialist’s quote for an uninformed client
is more attractive than that on the LOB. The incentive constraints prevent the broker from going
to the specialist when his client is informed. They state that the actual gains from trade obtained
by the broker on the LOB for his client plus the future commissions obtained by the broker if
he maintains the possibility of interacting with the specialist in the future must be greater than
the higher commissions obtained if the broker pretends his client is uninformed plus the future









































The restatement of the specialist’s problem points out that the incentive constraints diﬀer in
two dimensions. First, they diﬀer among traders since the gains from trade available on the LOB
depend on the agent’s type. Trading on the LOB is more attractive for high θ types, since they
evaluate the asset more and they are oﬀered bigger quantities in the book. Second, the incentive
constraints diﬀer since gains from cheating also depends on the agent’s type. The specialist oﬀers
only one contract, so any cheating trader pays the same price for the specialist’s quantity. However,
high θ types beneﬁt more from misreporting since they evaluate to a greater extent the quantity
traded with the specialist. This implies that the specialist’s quoted quantity determines the relevant
incentive constraint. If a large quantity is oﬀered, the relevant incentive constraint will be (ICh):
the specialist’s oﬀer is competitive with the one this agent gets on the LOB. If a small quantity is
oﬀered, then the high type can obtain better trading terms on the LOB. However, the oﬀer still
attracts informed clients with lower evaluations who get less on the LOB: (ICm) or (ICl
i) binds.
16We refer the reader to the proof of Proposition 1 for a detailed explanation of the rewriting.
15Notice also that the specialist’s oﬀer (both price and quantity) has a double inﬂuence on the
incentive constraints: on the one hand an attractive oﬀer increases the broker’s payoﬀ from misre-
porting, on the other it increases the beneﬁts of the interaction with the specialist in the future.










r is high, the broker will place a high value on the relationship with the specialist. The
broker thinks that he will often have uninformed clients in the future or that he will continue his
relationship with the specialist with a high probability. In this case, an attractive specialist’s oﬀer
decreases incentives to misreport. On the contrary, as r increases or as the asymmetric information




becomes lower than one, an attractive specialist’s quote increases incentives to misreport.
5.3 Analysis of the Specialist’s Price Schedule
We now wish to consider how the parameters r and η inﬂuence the specialist’s price schedule. The
following Proposition is obtained:
Proposition 1 The quantity oﬀered by the specialist is monotonically decreasing in r and η,w h i l e
the price oﬀered is a non monotone function of r and η. Explicit values for QS and PS are in the
Appendix.
We analyse as an example how the specialist varies the price and quantity oﬀered to uninformed
traders to compensate an increase in r, and so a decrease in the stability of the relationship with the
broker.17 The specialist’s choice is presented in Fig. 1, as a function of r. The picture shows that
as the relationship with the specialist worsens, the specialist’s quoted quantity decreases. On the
contrary, the price reaction is not monotonic. These results depend on the crucial role of incentive
constraints in the specialist’s choice. First, as opposed to a standard monopoly problem, the
binding incentive or participation constraint determines the specialist’s inverse demand function,
PS(QS). Therefore, the demand of the uninformed client can play no role in the specialist’s choice.
Second, the incentive constraints, as opposed to the uninformed client’s participation constraint,
become harder to satisfy when r increases. Hence, the specialist must react to the worsening of
the relationship if such constraints are binding. We diﬀerentiate two cases depending on the ratio
between asymmetric information and relationship trading.
Case 1: A low
pl
ni
r ratio. If the ratio
pl
ni
r is low, i.e. if r> 17
105(1 − 4η), the specialist faces
high incentives for the broker to misreport. Hence, he prefers to quote a small quantity and to
extract all gains from trade from the uninformed client in order to make cheating as unattractive
as possible for the broker: the (IRl
ni) constraint binds in this region. This implies that future
17A similar analysis applies to adverse selection costs (represented in our model by the probability of informed
trading, η) and is omitted in the paper.
16trading opportunities with the specialist have no value. The broker compares only actual gains in
order to decide whether reporting truthfully his customer’s type. Therefore, the stability of the
relationship with the specialist, r,d o e sn o ti n ﬂuence the broker’s choice. The specialist can oﬀer
the same price-quantity pair for any value of r,a sF i g .1s h o w s .
Case 2: A high
pl
ni
r ratio. If the ratio
pl
ni
r is high, i.e. if r ≤ 17
105(1 − 4η), the broker is
interested in keeping an ongoing relationship with the specialist since he values it highly. Hence,
the specialist can quote larger quantities and use the threat of relationship breaking to discipline
the broker: the (IRl
ni) constraint does not bind. This implies that in this case the specialist’s
quantity and price have to vary to compensate an increase in r and the consequent worsening of
the incentive constraints. Notice that both a decrease in the price or in the quantity quoted by
the specialist improve the incentive constraints: ∂(IC)/∂PS < 0 and ∂(IC)/∂QS < 0.18 In fact,
a more attractive oﬀer increases the value of keeping a good relationship with the specialist. But
should the specialist’s reaction to an increase in r focus on prices or on quantities?
Consider ﬁrst the price-quantity pair determined when the incentive constraint of the high type, θh,
binds. In Fig.1 this corresponds to the price and quantity quoted for r ≤ 2
33(1 − 4η).T h eo p t i m a l
quantity decreases as r increases: when the broker evaluates the relationship less, the specialist
lowers the oﬀered quantity in order to maintain truthtelling. In fact, the increase in the discount
rate moves down the inverse demand function given by ICh and the new intersection with the
marginal cost line implies a lower quantity.
However, the optimal price is not monotone in r:a sr increases, initially the price decreases and then
it increases. This eﬀect also depends on the fact that the inverse demand function is determined
by the incentive constraint of the high type. Since this constraint depends on both the specialist’s


















∗(r),r) is the inverse demand function and QS
∗(r) is the optimal quantity as a function
o ft h ed i s c o u n tr a t e . I fr increases, two opposite eﬀects are realized. On the one hand, the
incentive constraint worsens and the price should decrease to compensate. The ﬁrst negative part
of the derivative accounts for this eﬀect. On the other hand, the quoted quantity decreases, so
the specialist can increase the price and still keep the incentive constraint satisﬁed. This eﬀect
is represented by the second positive part of the derivative. Hence, the net eﬀect on price of
an increase in the discount rate is ambiguous. As it is evident from the picture, the ﬁrst eﬀect
dominates initially, while the second one increases in strength after a while.19
We now consider the price and quantity oﬀered by the specialist when both (ICh) and (ICm) bind.
In Fig.1 this corresponds to the price and quantity quoted for r ∈
£ 2




18The derivatives of the incentive constraints with respect to the specialist’s quantity are not always negative.
However, each incentive constraint derivative is always negative in the relevant regions, where the constraint binds.
19A similar explanation applies when the incentive constraint of type θ
m binds. In Fig.1 this corresponds to the







17optimal quantity is constant with respect to r, while the price is decreasing. In fact, two incentive
constraints are binding now and the specialist must select the quantity that solves: (ICh)=( ICm).
As r increases, the specialist has not anymore the option to decide between decreasing the price or
t h eq u a n t i t y .T h eq u a n t i t yi sﬁxed, so the only possibility to keep the incentive constraints satisﬁed
is to decrease the price.
6M a r k e t S t r u c t u r e C o m p a r i s o n
In this Section we compare the two presented market structures: the LOB and the LOB with a
specialist. First, we analyze the spread on the two markets. Second, we compare the two market
structures considering utilitarian social welfare. Finally, we present some empirical and policy
implications of our work.
6.1 Market Spread
Diﬀerent market structures are often compared in terms of quoted and eﬀective spreads. The quoted
spread is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the best bid and best ask oﬀered on the LOB and the
eﬀective spread as twice the diﬀerence between the transaction price and the midquote for a given
trade size. Clearly, the eﬀective spread reﬂects savings due to trading inside the quotes. Consider
ﬁrst the quoted spread: the LOB without a specialist clearly dominates as Lemma 2 shows. In
fact, the quoted spread catches only the negative part of the specialist’s introduction: the increase
in adverse selection costs on the LOB. In order to catch also the positive eﬀect, the decrease in
asymmetric information thanks to relationship trading, we should also consider trades inside the
quoted spread. In order to do this, it is necessary to focus on the average eﬀective spread on the
two markets. The following Proposition is obtained:
Proposition 2 The hybrid market oﬀers a lower average eﬀective spread for high levels of asym-
metric information, i.e. for η ≥ 1/7, while the LOB without a specialist oﬀers a lower average
eﬀective spread for low levels of asymmetric information, i.e. for η<1/12. For average levels of
asymmetric information, i.e. for η ∈ [1/12,1/7), the hybrid market or the pure LOB oﬀer a lower
average eﬀective spread depending on the value of r.
The hybrid market has a lower eﬀective spread for high levels of asymmetric information: both
markets oﬀer the same liquidity on the LOB, but the hybrid one oﬀers also the possibility to
trade with the specialist inside the quotes. For average levels of asymmetric information, the
strength of relationship trading becomes crucial to compare the eﬀective spreads. Initially the
hybrid market has a lower average eﬀective spread than the pure LOB for low values of r,s i n c e
the stable relationship with the broker allows the specialist to quote a low price. However, as η
decreases further, the eﬀective spread in the pure LOB market decreases as well. This implies that
the hybrid market starts to oﬀer a lower eﬀective spread only for the specialist’s best prices, and
so for “average” values of r. Finally, for low levels of asymmetric information, the pure LOB oﬀers
such a big quantity on the lowest level of the book that the eﬀective spread is always lower than in
the hybrid market independently from the strength of relationship trading.
186.2 Welfare Analysis
We deﬁne utilitarian social welfare as the expected gains from trade available on the market. We
compare the expected gains from trade on the LOB with a specialist, E(GTS),a n do nt h eL O B
without a specialist, E(GTLOB
a ).
Proposition 3 Utilitarian social welfare is higher on a LOB with a specialist for high levels of
adverse selection (η high) and on a LOB without a specialist for low levels of adverse selection (η
low). For average levels of adverse selection, a LOB with a specialist oﬀers a higher utilitarian
social welfare for low values of the discount rate, r.
Expected gains from trade depend on the trading terms oﬀered to informed and uninformed
traders by the two market structures. Informed traders trade only on the LOB. Hence, they are
indiﬀerent in terms of a LOB with or without a specialist if η ∈ [1/7,1/4],s i n c et h et w oL O B s
are identical. The situation changes for η ∈ [0,1/7). Now informed traders strictly prefer a LOB
without a specialist since they can obtain higher gains from trade. In fact, this market structure
oﬀers the same or larger quantities than the LOB with a specialist and at a lower price. If we
consider the uninformed traders, they prefer a LOB with a specialist if η ∈ [1/7,1/4]. A pure
LOB oﬀers zero gains from trade, while a hybrid market allows for positive gains from trade since
uninformed traders can exchange a positive quantity with the specialist. Notice that if r is greater,
the specialist will extract all rents from the uninformed traders who become indiﬀerent between
the two market structures. For η ∈ [0,1/7) the uninformed traders prefer a pure LOB or a LOB
with a specialist depending on the attractiveness of the specialist’s oﬀer, and so on the values of r
and η. Traders’ preferences are summarized in the following table:
Trader’s Preferred Market Structure
Trader’s Type η<1/7 η ∈ [1/7,1/4]
θh,θm,θl
i LOB only Indiﬀ.
θl
ni Depends on r, η LOB with Specialist or Indiﬀ.
Expected gains from trade are higher in a LOB with a specialist if adverse selection costs are high,
while they are higher in a LOB without a specialist if adverse selection costs are low. In the ﬁrst
case the introduction of the specialist on the market is a Pareto improvement since the specialist
provides liquidity to traders out of the market without a worsened LOB. In the second case the
necessity to induce truthtelling limits specialist’s oﬀer of liquidity and the trading terms oﬀered on
the pure LOB are better than the ones oﬀered on the LOB with a specialist even for uninformed
traders. Finally, for average levels of adverse selection, the discount rate determines which market
presents higher expected gains from trade. For low levels of the discount rate, the specialist can
oﬀer attractive quotes to uninformed traders and in this way compensate the lower gains from trade
available on the LOB to informed traders. On the contrary, for high levels of the discount rate,
the specialist’s oﬀer is not competitive enough to counterbalance the lower gains from trade on the
LOB. Results are summarized in Fig. 2.
19A second possible speciﬁcation of utilitarian social welfare is to consider the sum of expected
gains from trade and liquidity suppliers’ proﬁts. This second speciﬁcation reinforces the results
obtained when considering only gains from trade.20 In this case utilitarian social welfare still
coincides with the gains from trade in a LOB without a specialist, since liquidity suppliers are
competitive and πL =0 , while it is given by the sum of gains from trade and specialist’s proﬁts in
a LOB with a specialist. This implies that the region where the hybrid market is optimal is larger,
since we now include specialist’s proﬁts in the analysis. However, when asymmetric information
is low or relationship trading is weak, the LOB without a specialist still oﬀers a higher utilitarian
welfare than the hybrid market. The necessity to induce truthtelling limits specialist’s proﬁts.
Hence, they are not high enough to compensate the social loss due to the better trading terms
oﬀered on the LOB without a specialist.
6.3 Empirical Implications
A ﬁrst empirical implication of our work is related to the comparison of quoted and eﬀective spreads
between a pure LOB and a specialist market. The quoted spread should be better, on average,
in the pure LOB, since adverse selection is higher on the specialist market. The eﬀective spread
should be lower, on average, on the hybrid market for stocks thinly traded, stocks that have been
recently quoted and stocks with high levels of insider trading, since these stocks are more exposed
to asymmetric information problems. On the contrary, the eﬀective spread should be lower on
average on the pure LOB market for largely traded stocks and for stocks traded on the market
from a long time, less exposed to adverse selection problems.
A second empirical implication concerns the specialist’s quoted quantities and prices. The
specialist’s activity should concentrate on large trades when relationship trading works, and on
small trades when it does not. Moreover, the specialist’s price improvement should be small when
the relation with the broker is not stable or the risk of being picked-oﬀ is high, and large in
the opposite case. Notice also that the specialist uses both price and quantity to adjust for the
increasing asymmetric information or the worsening of relationship trading. Specialist’s reaction
seems to focus more on depth than on prices.
Third, we consider the eﬀective spread for diﬀerent trade sizes. In our model, the specialist
does not improve the eﬀective spread for all trade sizes since the oﬀered quantity depends on the
stability of his relationship with the broker.21 Therefore, if the specialist market oﬀers a lower
eﬀective spread on average than a pure LOB, for which trade sizes does the specialist improve
on the quotes? Our analysis suggests that when the broker/specialist relationship is stable, the
eﬀective spread is lower for big trades. The specialist can oﬀer big quantities to uninformed traders
without being afraid of incentivizing misreporting since reputation concerns matter a lot for brokers.
On the contrary, when the relationship is unstable, the eﬀective spread should be lower for small
trades. The specialist improves prices within the quotes only for small quantities to decrease
20A complete analysis of this second speciﬁcation of utilitarian social welfare is available upon the author.
21Since our model is discrete and quantities are endogenously determined, speciﬁc quantity sizes can be traded on
one market structure but not on the other. So, a direct comparison is not possible. However, dividing trades in size
groups, some empirical implications can be derived.
20broker’s incentives to misreport.
Finally, we consider the average number of trades. When asymmetric information problems
are high, we should expect more trades on the hybrid market: the specialist opens the market to
uninformed traders that would not trade in a pure LOB. Moreover, the greater intensity of trading
compared to a pure LOB should concentrate on small quantities if the broker/specialist relationship
is unstable and on big quantities if it is stable. The opposite situation occurs when asymmetric
information is low: in this case, the hybrid market closes the door to informed traders with a low
evaluation of the asset that would trade in a pure LOB. So, we should expect a lower number of
trades on average in a LOB with a specialist. Notice that we could still see on this market small
trades if the broker/specialist relationship is unstable, otherwise we should expect bigger traded
quantities on average.
6.4 Policy Implications
There is an ongoing debate about the advantages and disadvantages of diﬀerent market structures.
In particular, the role of the specialist on the NYSE has been questioned: is it beneﬁcial or not to
give a monopolist position in a stock to a proﬁt seeking agent, even if his market power is bounded
by competition from the LOB and regulatory requirements?
We compare a pure limit order book with a hybrid specialist market and we focus our analysis
on one important diﬀerence between the two market structures: relationship trading. Our work
shows that the hybrid market can improve on a pure LOB if adverse selection costs are high or if
the specialist/broker relationship is stable. In this case, the hybrid market oﬀers the same quoted
spread than a pure LOB, but a better eﬀective spread. Moreover, it guarantees a higher welfare
level. However, if adverse selection costs are low or if the specialist/broker relationship is unstable,
then the hybrid market is worse than a pure LOB. In fact, both the quoted and the eﬀective spread
are wider in the hybrid market, the specialist’s proﬁts are too low to compensate the loss in the
gains from trade due to the wider spread and social welfare is lower.
A crucial question arises: can competition among markets assure that the best market structure
is going to dominate? Introducing a specialist can be beneﬁcial for stocks thinly traded or highly
exposed to asymmetric information, but detrimental for other stocks that do not have high adverse
selection costs. Moreover, market conditions can change: a specialist system could be optimal in
the initial quotation phase of a stock, when investors are less informed about the asset and the
risk of exposure to insider trading is higher, but not optimal after a certain period, when the stock
starts to be better known by the general public. Therefore, it is important to understand if free
competition among markets can exclude the specialist market when it is suboptimal.
Our work suggests that the specialist hybrid market, once in place, cannot be overcome by
a competing pure limit order book even when the hybrid structure is suboptimal. In fact, the
specialist can always improve on the trading terms oﬀered to uninformed traders, given that he
owns an informative advantage due to relationship trading. Brokers, after looking at the pure
LOB quotations, can always go to the hybrid market to ask the specialist for price improvement.
Liquidity suppliers quoting on the pure LOB will anticipate the specialist’s cream skimming and
21oﬀer trading terms identical to the ones oﬀered by the LOB on the hybrid market. So, no price
improvement is provided by the competing pure LOB. However, the advantages of the hybrid
market should increase in time. In fact, once the specialist’s system is in place, the stability of
the broker/specialist relationship should increase and trading terms improve. This eﬀect should
partially compensate the competition proofness of this market structure.
In our setting, as in Glosten (1994), trading and liquidity should concentrate in one market
structure. However, diﬀerently from Glosten (1994), this market structure is not the pure LOB:
competition by a non-anonymous market architecture as the hybrid market seems to be successful.
If we compare our ﬁndings to Parlour and Seppi (2003), there are some diﬀerences. Even if theoret-
ically a pure LOB and a LOB with a specialist can coexist, no real increase in competition comes
from the pure LOB. Hence, competition seems not to be able to select the best market structure:
even if the pure LOB could be potentially more liquid than the hybrid market, the monopolistic
position of the specialist in relationship trading constrains market competition. Diﬀerently from
Parlour and Seppi (2003), we do not consider the possibility of allowing more traders to supply liq-
uidity ex-post. However, the beneﬁts of the specialist’s provision of liquidity ex-post are positively
related to the stability of his relationship with the broker. We think that multiple ex-post liquidity
suppliers would drastically reduce this stability and so the beneﬁts of relationship trading.
To summarize, our work shows that the introduction of a specialist on a LOB must be carefully
thought over. On the one hand, relationship trading can improve eﬀective spreads and social welfare
for thinly traded stocks or stocks with high adverse selection costs. On the other hand, the hybrid
market structure is suboptimal for largely traded stocks not exposed to high adverse selection.
Since our study suggests that competition among market structures can not be suﬃcient to select
the optimal one, a hybrid market could lead to wider spreads and lower welfare levels.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have analyzed the beneﬁts of relationship trading by comparing two market
structures. The ﬁrst is an anonymous LOB with free entry, the second is a LOB with a specialist.
In the LOB without a specialist, the market promotes competition among limit order traders in
order to supply liquidity. In the LOB with a specialist, the specialist can oﬀer better trading terms
to broker’s uninformed clients due to relationship trading. A trade-oﬀ arises: on the one hand,
the specialist worsens adverse selection on the book, but on the other, he lowers the asymmetric
information problem via relationship trading. So, in the hybrid market informed traders will go on
the anonymous LOB to beneﬁt from competition, while uninformed traders will go to the specialist,
to beneﬁt from relationship trading. Our analysis is divided in two parts. First, we have focused
on the inﬂuence of adverse selection costs and of LOB competition on the price schedule oﬀered by
the specialist to uninformed traders. Second, we have compared markets’ spreads and utilitarian
social welfare across the two market structures.
The specialist’s quoted depth is a monotone decreasing function of adverse selection costs and
a monotone increasing function of the probability of continuation of the relationship with the
specialist. On the contrary, the specialist’s quoted price is not monotone in these two parameters.
22If asymmetric information worsens or if the relationship with the broker is less stable, the specialist’s
reaction will focus more on depth than on the price. This result is consistent with empirical ﬁndings
about the importance of the quantity aspect of a specialist’s price schedule. In terms of social
welfare, we show that the specialist is Pareto improving for high levels of adverse selection. In fact,
in this case the LOB is already oﬀering a wide spread and the introduction of the specialist does
n o th a v ea n ye ﬀect on it. On the contrary, for low levels of adverse selection, the specialist lowers
the liquidity oﬀered on the LOB by competitive liquidity suppliers and can reduce social welfare.
Our results suggest that a relationship trading system can improve on the trading terms oﬀered
by the LOB for stocks that are highly exposed to adverse selection problems. On the contrary,
for stocks that are not exposed to high levels of asymmetric information, the introduction of the
specialist lowers social welfare. So, we expect that the specialist could induce a positive eﬀect
on market liquidity for stocks that are not frequently traded, for which asymmetric information
problems are more relevant, or for stocks more exposed to insider trading. It is important to notice
that the specialist can be beneﬁcial in welfare terms also for stocks with low adverse selection
problems if the relationship with the specialist is stable. In fact, in this last case the lower broker’s
gains from trade are compensated by the higher specialist’s proﬁt.
23Appendix A
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Limit traders are competitive, so the posted marginal price must be equal to the expected value of
the asset given that the order has been hit. This implies that, when computing the price for agent
e θ, limit traders anticipate that the order will be hit by any trader with an asset evaluation θ ≥ e θ.
Hence, prices are equal to upper tail expectations. A lower price would imply negative proﬁts,
while a higher price would be undercut by the other limit traders. Remember also that the LOB
is unable to discriminate between types θl
i and θl
ni. Quoted prices are the following:
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The investor trades only if the price oﬀered on the LOB is lower than his evaluation of the asset.
Given that θh =3 γσ2I, θm =2 γσ2I and θl = γσ2I, the price on the LOB can be too high for the
low type. We diﬀerentiate two cases:
CASE 1: η ≥ 1/7
Since Pl
LOB ≥ θl, limit traders anticipate that θl never hits an order at that price and oﬀer a




















qh + qm∗¢2 − 2γσ2Iqh − 5
3γσ2Iqm∗
´
where qm∗ is the solution of the ﬁrst maximization problem. So, ql∗ =0 , qm∗ = 1
3I and qh∗ = 2
3I.
CASE 2: η<1/7










































where ql∗ is the solution of the ﬁrst maximization problem and qm∗ the solution of the second one.
The ﬁnal solution is: ql∗ =
1−7η






I and qh∗ = 2
3I.
Notice that qm∗ is not always positive. For η<1/11 the limit order traders prefer to pool the low
and average type at price Pl
LOB =
8η


























The solution is ql∗ =
1−7η
1+η I and qh∗ =
8η
1+ηI.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
We ﬁrst show that the specialist can always improve on pure LOB quotes. We must check that the
specialist can both oﬀer a better quote and induce broker’s truthtelling. Notice that the specialist
can always oﬀer a better price since his asset evaluation is lower than the one of liquidity suppliers:
E(s | θ = θl
i)=0 . Consider a pure LOB and suppose that the specialist oﬀers to uninformed
clients a lower price than the LOB and a quantity such that GTS(θl
ni,θl
ni)=GTLOB(θl)+ε,w i t h
ε ≥ 0. Given that the price can be as small as zero, the specialist can always make such an oﬀer.
We diﬀerentiate two cases:
CASE 1: η ∈ [1/7,1/4]
In this case GTLOB(θl)=0and ql =0 . We focus on the broker’s truthtelling constraint when he


















3(1−4η) t h ec o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed for ε>0,w h i l ei fr ≥ 1
3(1−4η) t h ec o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed
for ε =0 .I ft h el o wt y p ec o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed, the other two constraints are satisﬁed as well for
QS < 1
18I. So, the specialist can always oﬀer a price-quantity pair that induces truthtelling and
gives to uninformed clients gains from trade at least equal to the ones they can obtain in a pure
LOB. A hybrid market always exists.
CASE 2: η ∈ [1/11,1/7)
In this case GTLOB(θl)=0and ql > 0. Broker’s truthtelling constraint when he has a client of
type θl

















T h es a m ea n a l y s i so fC a s e1a p p l i e s .I ft h el o wt y p ec o n s t r a i n ti ss a t i s ﬁed, the other two constraints
are satisﬁed as well for QS ≤ ql. A hybrid market always exists.
25CASE 3: η<1/11
Also in this case GTLOB(θl)=0and ql > 0, the same analysis of Case 2 applies. Again, a hybrid
market always exists and the constraints of types θm and θh are satisﬁed if QS <q l.
We now determine the optimal price and quantity oﬀered on the LOB. Marginal prices are still equal
to upper tail expectations of the asset value, but liquidity suppliers anticipate that the specialist
is going to improve LOB quotations for uninformed clients:
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The price oﬀered on the LOB is too high for the low type investor. Competitive limit traders
anticipate this and oﬀer a zero quantity at that price. The limit traders’ quoted quantities are
equal to the ones in Lemma 1 for η ∈ [1/7,1/4]: ql∗ =0 , qm∗ = 1
3I and qh∗ = 2
3I.N o t i c ea l s ot h a t
PSPEC = PLOB for both θh and θm.












ni),s i n c eθl
ni = θl
i. From the quantities determined in Lemma







i)=0 . The specialist’s problem can be







































Notice that if r ≤ (1−4η)/3,t h e n(ICl
i) and (IRl
ni) are both satisﬁed if GTS(θl
ni,θl
ni) ≥ 0.H o w e v e r ,
if r>(1 − 4η)/3,t h e n(ICl
i) is satisﬁed for GTS(θl
ni,θl










ni) binds in order to have (ICl




ni) and (ICm) binding
26c) (IRl






















The optimal quantity and price are: QS
a∗ = I, PS
a∗ = 1
2γσ2I. However, the quantity and price so
determined do not satisfy (ICh) and (ICm) and can not be a solution.
Case 1b: (IRl
ni) and (ICh) binding
From (IRl




72γσ2I. However, the quantity and price so
determined do not satisfy (ICm) and can not be a solution.
Case 1c: (IRl
ni) and (ICm) binding
From (IRl




36γσ2I. Given that the price and quantity
so determined satisfy (ICh), this will be the specialist’s choice.
CASE 2: r ≤ 1
3(1 − 4η)




i) and (ICm) binding
c) (ICl
i) and (ICh) binding
d) (ICh) binding
e) (ICm) binding
f) (ICm) and (ICh) binding
From the previous analysis, we already know that cases (a) and (b) can not be a solution, while




36γσ2I. We analyze the remaining cases.
Case 2d: (ICh) binding










































First, we check if the oﬀered quantity is positive: QS
d∗ is positive for r<1
9(1 − 4η) and for
r>1
3(1 − 4η). Given that we are considering the case r ≤ 1
3(1 − 4η), the only relevant region in
which QS
d∗ can be a solution is r<1
9(1 − 4η). In this case, we also have that PS
d∗ ≥ 0.M o r e o v e r ,
we check if QS
d∗ and PS
d∗ satisfy the omitted constraints : in the relevant region, (ICl
i) is satisﬁed
for r< 25
291(1 − 4η) and (ICm) for r< 2
33(1 − 4η). Therefore, QS
d∗ and PS
d∗ can be a solution only
for r< 2
33(1 − 4η).
Case 2e: (ICm) binding










































First, we check if the oﬀered quantity is positive: QS
e∗ is positive for r<1
6(1 − 4η) and for
r>1
3(1 − 4η). Given that we are considering the case r ≤ 1
3(1 − 4η), the only relevant region in
which QS
e∗ can be a solution is r<1
6(1 − 4η). In this case, we also have that PS
e∗ ≥ 0.M o r e o v e r ,
we check if the omitted constraints are satisﬁed by QS
e∗ and PS
e∗: in the relevant region, (ICl
i) is
satisﬁed for r< 17
105(1 − 4η) and (ICm) for r> 2
39(1 − 4η).S o ,QS
e∗ and PS
e∗ can be a solution only
for r ∈
£ 2




Case 2f: (ICm) and (ICh) binding








T h ep r i c ea n dq u a n t i t ys od e t e r m i n e ds a t i s f y(ICl
i). We also check that the price PS
f∗ is positive.
This is true for r< 65
438(1 − 4η).





















are feasible. The specialist selects the
quantity-price pair that maximizes his proﬁts. Given that πS
d∗ ≥ πS
f∗ >π S
c∗ in this interval,
























are feasible. Given that πS
f∗ >π S
c∗ in the region



























































are feasible. Given that πS
e∗ ≥ πS
c∗ in the region considered,


















is feasible and so is selected by the specialist.
To summarize, the specialist’s optimal choice is described in the following table:
Value of r Specialist’s Quantity Specialist’s Price
r< 2
















































From the price and quantity determined, it is straightforward to show that the specialist’s quantity
is monotonically decreasing in r and η, while the specialist’s price is not monotone in r and η.
Moreover, the level of adverse selection on the market, η,d o e sn o ti n ﬂuence the qualitative shape
of the price and quantity oﬀered by the specialist as a function of r. The parameter η only inﬂuences


















































is optimal increases. A similar reasoning applies to r and the
price and quantity oﬀered by the specialist as a function of η.
29P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Given that the model is symmetric we compute half spreads. The eﬀective half spread is the average
price paid for the transaction by the agent:







If a quantity is not traded in a market, we assume that the eﬀective spread is not available (n.a.)
for that quantity. The eﬀective half spread on a LOB without a specialist is the following:
LOB WITHOUT A SPECIALIST Q =
1−7η
1+η I Q = 1











LOB 3: η ∈ [1/7,1/4] n.a. 5
3γσ2I 17
9 γσ2I
The eﬀective half spread on a LOB with a specialist is represented in the following table:
LOB WITH A SPECIALIST Q = 1
18I Q = QS
e∗ Q = 1
3I Q = 5
9I Q = QS
d∗ Q = I
r< 2






















3γσ2I n.a. n.a. 17
9 γσ2I
r ≥ 17
105(1 − 4η) 35
36γσ2I n.a. 5
3γσ2I n.a. n.a. 17
9 γσ2I
Average eﬀective spreads are computed as a weighted average of the eﬀective spreads on a given
market, were weights are given by the probabilities that a speciﬁc trade takes place. The Proposition
is derived from the comparison of these values.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
We compute the expected gains from trade considering the optimal quantities for the LOB and the
specialist derived in Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Proposition 1. The Proposition is obtained from the
comparison between the gains from trade in the two tables.




LOB 2: η ∈ [1/11,1/7[
(9−41η−253η2+1525η3)
54(1+η)2 γσ2I
LOB 3: η ∈ [1/7,1/4]
13η
54 γσ2I




























We consider the case where the broker who has an uninformed client goes to the LOB when he is
indiﬀerent in terms of trading on the LOB or with the specialist. The only diﬀerence with the case
presented in the paper is that when r ≥ 1
3(1−4η) an hybrid market does not exist. In fact, in this
case the specialist can only oﬀer the same gains from trade than the LOB to uninformed traders
as the proof of Lemma 2 shows. The Lemma is modiﬁed as follows:
Lemma 3 If r ≥ 1
3(1−4η) a hybrid market does not exist, while if r<1
3(1−4η) ah y b r i dm a r k e t
exists. When the hybrid market exists, quantities and prices quoted on a LOB with a specialist are
equal to the ones quoted on a LOB without a specialist for high levels of asymmetric information,
i.e. for η ∈ [1/7,1/4].22
The specialist’s price and quantity become:
Value of r Specialist’s Quantity Specialist’s Price
r< 2

























































If we compare this table with the one derived in the proof of Proposition 1, the only diﬀerence is
that now, if r ≥ 1
3(1 − 4η), the specialist cannot improve anymore on LOB trading terms. The
relationship with the specialist is too unstable compared to the probability of having uninformed
clients on the market in the future. Hence, the specialist cannot oﬀer higher gains from trade to
them than the LOB. Given our assumption, uninformed traders prefer then to go to the LOB.
As far as the utilitarian welfare comparison is concerned, all the previous results hold. However,
we cannot compare anymore the two markets for r ≥ 1
3(1 − 4η) since only the pure LOB exists.
If we consider empirical and policy implications, the only relevant diﬀerence is about competition
proofness. In this setting, the specialist system still stays in place even if ineﬃcient. However,
now an exogenous worsening of relationship trading or asymmetric information could drive the
specialist out of the market. Given that usually the stability of the relationship improves with time
and that asymmetric information decreases when a stock is traded from a long time, such changes
are unlikely to happen once the specialist system is in place.
22The proof is closely related to the one of Lemma 2 and is available upon the author.
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Figure 2: GAINS FROM TRADE COMPARISON.
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